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Occupy the System! Societal
Constitutionalism and Transnational
Corporate Accounting
MORITz RENNER*
ABSTRACT
Today's most pressing constitutional question is posed by a global
economic system whose expansive tendencies seem no longer controllable.
In addressing this question, the theory of Societal Constitutionalism
apparently shifts established ideological coordinates by developing a
theory of the self-constitutionalization of social spheres. It seeks to
combine the virtues of grassroots democracy with the sophistication of
systemic social theory. Thus, its normative claim can be formulated as
an oxymoron: "Occupy the System!" The claim is an oxymoron because it
points to the apparent impossibility of critical social theory in a
functionally differentiated society: How can a functional system such as
the economy be "occupied" or "democratized"? Yet the oxymoron contains
a grain of truth. With a view to the concrete example of transnational
standard-setting procedures in the field of corporate accounting, this
article examines institutional and systemic processes that enable an
emerging political discourse at the core of the global economic system.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OF LATE MODERNITY
Whereas the central constitutional question of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century has been the taming of the political leviathan,
constitutional theory in the twentieth century has had a different-if
sometimes implicit-agenda: the control of economic power. Ever since
Georg Friedrich Hegel's lucid analysis of the emergence of bourgeois
society,' social theory has struggled with the challenge of an
* Lichtenberg Professor of Transnational Commercial Law and Legal Theory,
University of Bremen (Germany).
1. GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM HEGEL & GEORG LASSON, GRUNDLINEN DER PHILOSOPHIE
DES RECHTS [BASE LINES OF PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] §§ 183, 257 (Felix Meiner Verlag 1911)
(1821) (Ger.).
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increasingly self-referential economic system. Economic modernization
allowed for individual emancipation from the close-knit social fabric of
premodern times, but at the same time-and even more so with the rise
of corporate capitalism2-threatened the very possibility of collective
political self-determination. Social and political movements throughout
the last century have sought to overcome this dialectical tension, often
by violent means.3 From today's perspective, the golden age of the
welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century seems no more
than a short respite from the continuing struggle, while economic
globalization has begun to move the conflict to another arena.
The current financial crisis poses the constitutional question of late
modernity anew: the question of how to contain the overexpansive
tendencies of an economic system ever more disembedded from its
societal context.4 The answers to this new-old constitutional question
range from the austerity-oriented approaches followed by the
governments of Germany and other Northern European countries in the
context of Eurozone negotiations to the anarchist ideas of the "Occupy
Now!" movement. As different as these answers may seem at first sight,
they can be clearly situated in an ideological coordinate system that has
basically remained unchanged since the 1920s (Part II). The
constitutional form of the modern nation-state has for some decades
rendered the ideological-and conflictual-nature of political economy
almost invisible. Now, it is brought to plain light by contemporary
processes of transnationalization (Part III). The transnational arena not
only calls for, but also allows for fresh answers to the constitutional
question of late modernity; one of these answers might be offered by the
project of Societal Constitutionalism (Part IV). The project of Societal
Constitutionalism merges existing and seemingly contradictory theories
of political economy into a normative claim, which can be formulated as
"Occupy the System!" The claim, however, is an oxymoron: you can
occupy a bank, but you cannot occupy the financial system. The theory
of Societal Constitutionalism is based on this oxymoronic claim.
Starting from systems theory's insight that the functional
2. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 357 (Macmillan 1948) (1932) ("The rise of the modern corporation has
brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the
modern state-economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. . . . The
future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not on an equal
plane with the state, but even superseding it as the dominant form of social
organization.").
3. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN GLOBALIZATION 21-23 (2012) (on "totalitarian societal constitutionalim").
4. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) (regarding the
notion of "disembeddedness").
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differentiation of economy, politics, and law is irreversible, the theory
nevertheless tries to define the conditions for a mutual irritation and
interaction of those social systems. This paper, while considering with a
view to the example of transnational standard setting in corporate
financial reporting (Part V), tries to apply the paradoxical claim of
Societal Constitutionalism to the newly emerging transnational
institutions in the global economic system (Part VI).
II. IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS: ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY VERSUS ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In the first half of the twentieth century, two different traditions
have laid the groundwork for contemporary discussions of political
economy. The German debate of the Weimar Republic has labeled these
approaches as Economic Democracy (Wirtschaftsdemokratie) on the one
hand and Economic Constitutionalism (Wirtschaftsverfassung) on the
other. Searching for a "third way" between laissez-faire liberalism on
the one hand, and socialist planned economies on the other, they both
explicitly frame the problem of economic power in-albeit
different-constitutional terms.
The ideas of Economic Democracy were developed by socialist and
social democratic thinkers. As the head of a trade union supported
research group, economist Fritz Naphtali elaborated his influential
theory of Wirtschaftsdemokratie in 1928,5 explicitly referring to earlier
concepts of "Industrial Democracy" developed in Great Britain.6
Naphtali defines two central tenets of Economic Democracy. On the one
hand, he sees Economic Democracy as based on a "critique of the
shortcomings of political democracy"; on the other hand, he conceives its
goal as "a form of economic constitution, a democratic constitution of the
economy as opposed to economic autocracy."7 To reach this goal, he
demands a "democratization of the economy," that is, "the abolishment
of all authority and the transformation of the leading organs of the
economy from organs of capitalist interest into those of the common
interest."8
Translating this demand into concrete policy objectives, however,
Naphtali opts for a rather modest strategy of opening the economic
process to inputs from political discourse through specific legal and
5. FRITZ NAPHTALI, WIRTsCHAFrSDEMOKRATIE. IHR WESEN, WEG UND ZIEL (Europaische
Verlagsanstalt 4 ed. 1977 [1928]).
6. See generally SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1926 ed.)
(1897) (describing trade unions and collective bargaining).
7. NAPHTALI, supra note 5, at 29.
8. Id. at 30.
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organizational institutions: employment law, workers' councils within
corporations, representation of workers in political institutions, political
control of monopolies, and the promotion of consumers' associations.9
Naphtali thus relies on both the democratic parliamentary institutions
of the nation-state and democratic bodies within corporations and other
private bodies.
In the United States, similar ideas were developed by one of the
leading corporate lawyers of his time, Adolf A. Berle. In his 1959 book
Power Without Property, Berle recapitulates his earlier ideas about
economic power and at the same time tries to develop an adequate
theory of legitimacy, reflecting the "reality of economic democracy."1 0
For Berle, the main source of legitimacy for economic power is public
consensus. By posing a hypothetical situation of what would transpire if
"a well-known gangster were by some accident to be duly elected a
director and duly chosen President of the United States Steel
Corporation," he explains that, even in economic contexts, formal legal
procedures are seldom sufficient to generate legitimacy." However, to
assess legitimacy, he goes on to explain that "conventional stereotypes
of 'democratic procedure' are not particularly helpful." 2 "Public
consensus," he observes, is usually not the consensus of a general public
or even within a parliamentary legislature, but rather refers to the
common persuasion of a certain community, often dominated by "the
conclusions of careful university professors, the reasoned opinions of
specialists, the statements of responsible journalists, and at times the
solid pronouncements of respected politicians."13 Different approaches in
Economic Democracy, while agreeing on the goal of opening the
economy to political discourse, thus expose widely divergent views on
what they define as political discourse.
In theories of Economic Constitutionalism, in contrast, which
emerged roughly at the same time, the concept of the political is hardly
defined at all. Their main contribution to the debate, however, lies in
their highlighting of the role of law in the interaction of economy and
politics. Economic Constitutionalism has its roots in ordoliberal
thought, which conceives the economy as a self-regulating system that
cannot be politicized without sacrificing the basic principles of economic
freedom. At the same time, ordoliberal thought acknowledges both the
self-destructive tendencies of the economic system arising out of the
9. Id. at 148-64 (on employment law), 172-74 (on workers' councils), 35-51 (on control
of monopolies), 93-108 (on consumers' associations).
10. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 110-16 (1959).
11. Id. at 109.
12. Id. at 108.
13. Id. at 113.
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concentration of private power and the harmful effects of the market
mechanism on other social spheres. Therefore, a (constitutional) legal
framework should contain the functional rationality of the economic
system by laying down the economic "rules of the game." 14
Franz B6hm, one of the early masterminds of the ordoliberal school,
develops this line of thought in his theory of a private law society.15
Only a market society under the rule of law and autonomous from the
domain of political power, he argues, can protect the freedom of its
citizens. 16 With this approach, Bohm attacks the dominant corporatist
zeitgeist by claiming that trusts and monopolies constitute a form of
"private power and private coercion" that has to be controlled by law.17
The accumulation of economic power is considered a problem not only
for the economic system but for society as a whole, specifically with a
view to potential spillover effects in the political system.18 Economic
power is identified as a threat to "social justice and civil liberties,"19 as
concerning not only the realm of private law but also the very idea of
democratic citizenship. 20 On this basis, early ordoliberals argued that
significant aspects of society, such as the education of its citizens, 2 1
should be expressly exempted from the market mechanism,
acknowledging that "the sober world of pure business draws from moral
resources that are essential and more important than any principle of
economics. Market, competition and the interplay of supply and demand
do not create but only consume such reserves and must obtain them
from spheres beyond the market."22
As a consequence, the role of law is seen as both preserving and
limiting the autonomy of the economic system in its relation to other
14. FRANZ BOHM, DIE ORDNUNG DER WIRTSCHAFr ALS GESCHICHTLICHE AUFGABE UND
RECHTSSCHOPFERISCHE LEISTUNG 139 (1937).
15. Franz Bbhm, Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft [Private Law Society
and Market Economy], 17 ORDO 75 (1966) (Ger.).
16. Id. at 78.
17. Franz Bhm, Das Problem der privaten Macht [The Problem with Power], 3 DIE
JUSTIZ 324 (1928) (Ger.).
18. See Franz B6hm, Demokratie und 6konomische Macht [Democracy and Economic
Power], in KARTELLE UND MONOPOLE IM MODERNEN RECHT [CARTELS AND MONOPOLIES IN
MODERN LAW] 1, 8 (Institut far auslandisches und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht an der
Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt am Main ed. 1960); see also B6hm, supra
note 15, at 121.
19. B6hm, supra note 18, at 8 (author's translation).
20. See id. at 21.
21. See Bohm, supra note 15, at 102.
22. Wilhelm Ropke, Ethik und Wirtschaftsleben [Ethics and Economic Life], in
WIRTSCHAVSETHIK HEUTE: DREI REDEN AN JEDEN, DER PRODUZIERT, KAUFr UND VERKAUF'
[BUSINESS ETHICS TODAY: THREE SPEECHES TO ANYONE WHO PRODUCES, BUYS, AND SELLS]
24 (Wilhelm Rfpke, et al. eds.,1956) (Ger.).
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functional systems of society. Specifically, the legal system shall
mediate between the economic and the political system: "[c]onflicts
between economy and politics are solved according to the principle of
functional differentiation and formulated as questions of law."23
The ordoliberal concept of Economic Constitutionalism obviously
has close ties to approaches in social theory, which, based on
Luhmannian systems theory, describe modern societies as fragmented
into self-referential systems following different and incommensurable
functional rationalities. Very much like the ordoliberals, Niklas
Luhmann describes the economic system as no longer controllable by
political interventions,24 and-at the same time-stresses the
limitations of economic rationality and the "progressive 'arthrosis of the
invisible hand."' 25 Yet, while ordoliberals put their hopes in a legal
"framework order" for the economy, Luhmann does not share such
beliefs: 26 "There is no way back to paradise."2 7 The more optimistic ideas
of Economic Democracy, in contrast, have been taken up by the
Habermasian strand of Critical Theory, which calls for a reconciliation
of the individual autonomy of the economic subject with the collective
self-determination of the political community. 28
III. BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
In the historical reality of the Western European states after World
War II, the ideas of ordoliberal Economic Constitutionalism have had an
especially considerable impact. The legal and political framework of the
newly born European Economic Community was expressly conceived as
the economic constitution of the European internal market. 29 The
constitutional rules of a Rechtsgemeinschaft held both economic and
23. Peter Behrens, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung [World Economic Constitution], in JAHRBUCH
FOR NEUE POITISCHE OKONOMIE 5, 8 (Karl-Ernst Schenk et al. eds., 2000) (Moritz Renner,
trans.) (Ger.); see also Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Macht-Recht-Wirtschaftsverfassung
[Power-Law-Economic Constitution], 173 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND
WIRTSCHAYTSRECHT 97 (1973) (GER.).
24. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE WIRTSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE ECONOMY OF CIVIL
SOCIETY] 103 (1988) (Ger.).
25. Id. at 100.
26. Id. at 104 n. 26.
27. Id. at 344.
28. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS. CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 445 (1996).
29. See generally WERNER MUSSLER, DIE WIRTSCHAFl'SVERFASSUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFT IM WANDEL [THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN
TRANSITION] (1998) (Ger.).
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political power at bay30 by focusing on market freedoms and competition
law. 31 At the same time, the ideas of Economic Democracy were largely
marginalized and dismissed as socialist utopias. 32 Only during a brief
period in the heyday of the welfare state did concepts such as workers'
codetermination gain a certain political support and, in Germany, were
transposed into legal rules on the "corporate constitution"
(Unternehmensverfassung).33 In this time period, the European welfare
state presented itself as a fusion of ordoliberal Economic
Constitutionalism and social democratic Economic Democracy, a
"historical compromise" 34-however, on a strong neocorporatist note.
The U.S. debate, meanwhile, was hardly irritated by these
constitutionalist conceptions of the economy. Here, Keynesianism and
Chicago School neoliberalism, as the two dominant economic paradigms,
not only took their turns with changing governmental policies, but
gradually dissolved into a peculiar amalgamate. 35 Despite their
apparent differences, these approaches erode rather than stabilize the
boundary between economy and politics-and thus avoid any kind of
constitutional terminology. While Keynesianism makes the case for
direct, politically induced interventions in the market, the Chicago
School, in contrast, seeks to subject even the state and the political
process to the functional imperatives of the economic system.3 6
On both sides of the Atlantic, however, political economy was long
considered a domestic affair. Both the European model of the welfare
state and U.S. Keynesianism (which has been widely adopted by
European policy makers since the 1960s) presuppose the centralized
institutions of the nation-state are able to stabilize and intervene in the
economic process. It was only the pure theory of Chicago School
neoliberalism that seemed to allow for a model of political economy
outside the nation-state, conceiving the economy as a globalized system
beyond the reach of domestic politics. This simplified model obscured
30. See generally WALTER HALLSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFr [THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY] (1973) (Ger.).
31. See Christian Joerges, What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A
Melancholic Eulogy, 30 EUR. L. REV. 461 (2005).
32. See Franz Bahm, Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung fir die politische
Verfassung, SODDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 141 (1946) (Ger.).
33. See Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen. Bericht der Sachverstindigenkommission zur
Auswertung der bisherigen Erfahrungen mit der Mitbestimmung, BT-Drucksache VI/334,
1970 [report of a high-level expert commission instituted by the German Parliament].
34. Christian Joerges, Working Through 'Bitter Experiences' Towards a Purified
European Identity?, in LAW, DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY IN A POST-NATIONAL UNION 175,
183 (Erik Oddvar Eriksen, et al. eds., 2008).
35. See COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 97-124 (2011).
36. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, NAIssANCE DE IA BIOPOLITIQUE: COURS AU COLLtGE DE
FRANCE (1978-1979) 222-239 (2004) (Fr.).
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the highly political nature of economic globalization for a long time by
depicting it as a quasi-natural phenomenon. 37
Interestingly, however, the neoliberal project itself reverted to
constitutional terminology when it came to justifying the effects of
economic globalization against growing political protest. Now, the
so-called New Constitutionalism embodied by the global institutions of
the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and the International Investment regime entered the
stage.38 At this point, in the late 1990s, all sides of the ideological
spectrum began to (once again) discuss questions of global political
economy in constitutional terms. Neoliberals employed constitutional
rhetoric to reject the regulatory claims of nation-state governments in
the framework of the international free trade regime, while social
democratic politicians, trade unions, and the so-called antiglobalization
movement vociferously defended the economic constitutions of the
national welfare states.39 After the first stages of the current financial
and debt crisis, European Union (EU) member states, led by Germany
and France, have joined the antiglobalization movement by defending
their ordoliberal economic constitution against "the financial markets."
At the same time, new social movements such as the "Occupy Now!"
movement, much in the spirit of earlier Economic Democracy
approaches, demand a democratization of the economic sphere.
IV. THE PROJECT OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
It is the historical and ideological framework depicted above in
which Gunther Teubner's project of Societal Constitutionalism finds its
place. Teubner, however, expressly rejects the approaches of both
Economic Democracy and Economic Constitutionalism. 40 He does so for
two distinct but closely related reasons. On the one hand, he argues that
approaches such as Economic Democracy, which aim at a politicization
of social sectors beyond the political system, do not sufficiently respect
the particular rationalities of the social sectors concerned, but try to
transpose a model of the political process which is bound to fail outside
the institutions of the nation-state. 41 On the other hand, he criticizes
the model of Economic Constitutionalism for universalizing the
37. See id. at 52-79.
38. See, e.g., David Schneidermann, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 757 (2000).
39. Cf. JURGEN HABERMAS, DIE POSTNATIONALE KONSTELLATION. POLITISCHE ESSAYS
117-122 (1998). (Ger.)
40. See TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 26-33.
41. Id. at 26-29.
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rationality of the economic system and applying it to any other social
sphere.42 Thus, it is the imperialism of both politics and economy
against which Societal Constitutionalism seeks to position itself.
It seems questionable whether Teubner's critique is based on an
adequate reconstruction of existing approaches in Economic Democracy
and Economic Constitutionalism. Specifically, he reads ordoliberal
theory as a mere continuation of the classical economic tradition
without recognizing its aim of limiting economic power as a genuinely
sociopolitical agenda.43 But the argument Teubner develops from here
nonetheless offers a promising conceptual framework for analyzing the
constitutional questions raised by a globalized economy. The strength in
Teubner's approach is that he sees the ideas of Economic Democracy
and Economic Constitutionalism not as mutually exclusive, but as
complementary. On the one hand, he shares with Economic Democracy
the aim of politicizing social spheres, such as the economy. 44 On the
other hand, he shares with Economic Constitutionalism the aim of
identifying higher-level norms which both constitute and limit society's
functional subsystems-including, but not restricted to, the political
system.45 The normative agenda of Societal Constitutionalism thus
takes on the somewhat paradoxical form of "Occupy the System!" and
the boundaries of functional rationalities are at the same time reflected
and subverted. 46
In pursuing this agenda, however, Teubner situates his starting
point much closer to traditional approaches in Economic
Constitutionalism than he seems willing to admit. In fact, the concept of
the economic constitution as developed by early ordoliberal thinkers,
such as B6hm, never called for an expansion of economic rationality to
the whole of society, but rather for a containment of both the economic
and the political system by law.47 The tendency of such approaches to
42. Id. at 30-34.
43. The claim that "ordoliberal theory transforms the economic constitution into the
constitution for the whole society" (id. at 30) and "is blind to economic expansionist
tendencies" (id. at 31) is certainly not accurate for German ordo-liberalism in the tradition of
Eucken, B6hm and R6pke. Admittedly, later exponents of the theory, starting with Hayek,
have merged into neoclassical mainstream on this ambivalent heritage. Compare, for
example, PHIIP MANOW, Ordoliberalismus als okonomische Ordnungstheologie, 29
LEVIATHAN 179 (2001) (Ger.).
44. See TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 114-23.
45. Id. at 75-88.
46. GUNTHER TEUBNER, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula
of Law?, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2009).
47. Cf. Mestmicker, supra note 23, at 104.
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embrace expertocratic or authoritarian structures, however, has rightly
been criticized by scholars like Christian Joerges. 48
It is therefore the attempt to introduce elements of Economic
Democracy that is both crucial and very promising in Teubner's
approach. Ordoliberal approaches to Economic Constitutionalism, which
call for a containment of both economic and political power by the rule of
law, have indeed often proven unsatisfactory if not dangerous, replacing
economic and political power structures by no less powerful
nonmajoritarian institutions. Here, Economic Democracy's promise of
abolishing authoritarian institutions in both the economic and the
political system and instead coupling both systems through processes of
democratic deliberation unfolds its critical potential.
Yet at this point, Teubner's theory takes another turn that distances
itself from its historical precursors in a rather forced way. Teubner
criticizes approaches in Economic Democracy for their supposed fixation
on the nation-state's political constitution.49 At the same time, he
reduces the political system to "institutionalized politics"-and then
elaborates on a conceptual distinction between "la politique" and "le
politique" to lay the ground for his claim that Societal
Constitutionalization should focus on the "internal politics of social
subsystems." 5 0 This turn to a double concept of politics and the political,
however, is bound to entrench a rather artificial separation between
institutionalized politics within the nation-state and political action
beyond the nation-state.
Admittedly, the idea behind the distinction between "la politique"
and "le politique" is appealing, as it seems to be well founded in systems
theory. Luhmann acknowledges that the functional systems of society
have inherent potentials for self-reflection and for reflecting on their
identity in relation to other functional systems of society.51 It is these
potentials for self-reflection that Teubner addresses with his concept of
le politique. With regard to the economic system, for example, he argues
that central banks can be seen as an institutionalized form of systemic
self-reflection, as allowing a self-limitation of the money medium
without intervention from the political system (i.e., la politique).52
48. See Joerges, supra note 31.
49. This fixation was certainly not present in early socialist strands of the theory. See
NAPHTALI, supra note 5, at 30-31 (describing the role of the state and, more generally, the
'polity' for realizing Economic Democracy).
50. TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 114-23.
51. NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIALE SYSTEME: GRUNDRIB EINER ALLGEMEINEN THEORIE
[SOCIAL SYSTEMS: OUTLINE OF A GENERAL THEORY] 234 (1984) (Ger.).
52. TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 96-102.
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The example of central banks, however, shows that Teubner's
approach does not sufficiently reflect on the ambiguous role of such
institutions within both the economic and the political system: central
banks' decisions on monetary policy are neither reducible to the medium
of the economic system (money) nor to the medium of the political
system (power). Rather, they take on a mediating role between both
functional systems without being wholly integrated into either of them.
This is why Luhmann expressly names central banks as an example for
the structural coupling between economy and politiCS. 53 And this is also
why Teubner himself, tellingly, formulates his claims for "full money
reform" as claims for a political reform of the Statute of the European
Central Bank.54 The idea of an internal system reflection of le politique,
therefore, does not seem to sufficiently account for the enduring
importance of the political system in late capitalist society.
What Teubner's approach rightly stresses on the basis of
Luhmannian systems theory is the idea that political communication is
not necessarily limited to the institutions of the nation-state.55 Yet this
does not follow from system-specific modes of reflection, but from the
nature of political communication itself. For Luhmann, political
communication is communication that is articulated in the power
medium.56 As such, it is pervasive in all functional systems of society.
The central issue for systems theory as a theory of functional
differentiation, then, is to define the conditions under which such
communication can develop into a functional system of its own.57
Historically, these conditions have been fulfilled with the emergence of
the modern nation-state, which provided for a separation of political
offices from personal and familial relations and, at the same time,
instituted a procedural framework for the filling of such positions,
namely elections.55 Under these conditions, political communication
became self-referential: the relevance of social issues within the political
and electoral process became itself a political question, a question
determined in political procedures.59
This Luhmannian model of politics as a self-referential system can,
by way of generalization and respecification, be transposed to the
transnational arena. Indeed, it provides an excellent conceptual
53. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM] 451
(1993) (Ger.); see also LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 345.
54. TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 100-01.
55. Id. at 114-23.
56. NIIGAS LUHMANN, DIE POLITIK DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY]
45, 75 (2002) (Ger.).
57. Id. at 69, 76.
58. Id. at 91-94.
59. Id. at 86.
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framework for analyzing novel constellations of economy, politics, and
law beyond the nation-state. My contribution therefore relies on a very
basic model of systemic differentiation without employing the
Teubnerian distinction between la politique and le politique. It does,
however, agree with what I suppose to be the central tenets of the
theory of Societal Constitutionalism, that is, (1) that the approaches of
Economic Constitutionalism and Economic Democracy are compatible;
and (2) that those approaches must be generalized and respecified for an
analysis of constitutionalization processes beyond the nation-state. The
basic features of an economic constitution allowing for processes of
political reflection will thus be both defined in an abstract manner and
illustrated by concrete phenomena in social practice.
V. PROJECT AND PRACTICE: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ECONOMY
This generalization and respecification will be undertaken with a
view to the example of transnational standard-setting in corporate
financial reporting. My analysis here proceeds in two steps. In the first
step, I will show how the field of corporate financial reporting is shaped
by transnational rules of law (Part A). In the second step, I will analyze
both the constitutive and the limitative function that (secondary) legal
rules play in this field, thus enabling a process of constitutionalization
in the strict sense (Part B). This constitutionalization process has two
different aspects: a hierarchization of norms on the one hand (Part B.1),
and the emergence of a structural coupling between economy, law,
politics, and science, on the other (Part B.2).
A. International Financial Reporting Standards as Transnational Law
Rules on financial reporting play a paramount role in market
economies dominated by corporations. Such rules are almost as old as
capitalism itself: As early as 1673, France first established a duty for
enterprises to publish annual reports.60  Initially, reporting
requirements had the primary purpose of enabling state oversight of
corporate finance, for example, to avoid bankruptcies and protect
creditors.61 A similar approach to regulating financial reporting was
soon taken by other continental European nation-states. In Great
60. Stanley E. Howard, Public Rules for Private Accounting in France, 1673 and 1807,
57 THE ACCOUNTING REV. 91 (1982).
61. See CHRISTOPH WATRIN, Einfiihrung in die Rechnungslegung nach IFRS [Introduction
to Accounting According to IFRS], in MONCHENER KoMmENTAR ZUM BILANZRECHT [MUNICH
COMMENTARY ON ACCOUNTING LAW] para. 1, (Joachim Hennrichs ed. 2008) (Ger.).
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Britain and the United States, in contrast, where economies were
traditionally more oriented toward equity investors and capital
markets, 62 financial reporting was considered a matter of private
interest alone.63 Corporations were thought to have sufficient incentives
to disclose their financial situation because they had to attract investors
on the capital markets. Notwithstanding stronger regulatory
interventions after the 1929 economic crisis and the ensuing
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
standard-setting in financial reporting was therefore largely left to
private bodies.64
Only at the end of the twentieth century, with economic
globalization and an ever-stronger integration of global capital markets,
did the need arise for a worldwide harmonization of financial reporting
standards.6 5 While continental European harmonization attempts
remained limited to the EU context, the first steps toward the
elaboration of global financial reporting standards were taken with the
establishment of the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) in 1973, a private standard-setting organization domiciled in
London.66 Early codifications of financial reporting standards elaborated
by the IASC, the International Accounting Standards (IAS), remained of
rather marginal relevance until 2000, when the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recommended IAS
standards as a requirement for domestic stock market listings.6 7 In the
same year, the European Commission made financial reporting
according to the IAS compulsory for large European groups of
companies.66 Now the IAS-succeeded by the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS)-are on the way to becoming the globally
accepted standard in corporate financial reporting.69
After the first stages of the current financial crisis, financial
reporting standards set by the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), the successor organization of the IASC, have been heavily
62. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
(Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
63. See Walter Mattli & Tim Buthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 237
(2005).
64. Watrin, supra note 61, at para. 2.
65. Mattli & Bitthe, supra note 63, at 228.
66. Watrin, supra note 61, at paras. 3-7.
67. Cf. Mattli & Biuthe, supra note 63, at 252.
68. Regulation (EC) No.1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
July 2002 on the Application of International Accounting Standards.
69. Watrin, supra note 61, at 10.
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criticized, especially in continental Europe. 70 The main thrust of the
critique was directed at the IAS and IFRS principle of "fair value"
accounting.71 The "fair value" principle demands that a corporation's
assets be reflected in financial reports according to their current market
price. The principle, thus, stands in stark contrast to the "principle of
conservatism" traditionally embodied, for example, by German
commercial law. Its critics argue that the "fair value" principle has, by
its procyclical effects, accelerated the financial meltdown of the first
years of the crisis. 72
But what is, after all, the status of such principles? How can the
recommendations of a private standard-setting body have potentially
harmful effects on the global economy? These questions can be
answered by reconstructing the IASB standard-setting process as a
transnational legal process, enabling a self-regulation of the economic
sphere backed by procedural rules of law.78 An in-depth discussion of
the legal nature of the IAS and IFRS standards is not even necessary
for this purpose. 74 Even from the perspective of state-centered legal
positivism the standards must be considered legal norms, as they are
expressly granted this status by EU legislation.75 Therefore, domestic
courts can apply and interpret the standards. The IAS and IFRS
standards themselves apparently reflect their nature as legal norms in
their internal structure: they define applicability and scope, lay down
well-defined duties and obligations (such as "an entity shall prepare"),
include list of defined terms, and conclude with an "effective date."76
The genesis of the standards is typical for transnational legal
processes in three different respects.77 First, they erode the boundary
between public and private modes of governance: public regulatory
authorities delegate quasi-legislative powers to a private
standard-setting body, and the rules made by this private body are
70. For an overview, see e.g. Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, The Crisis of Fair-
Value Accounting: Making Sense of the Recent Debate, 34 ACCOUNTING, ORGANIZATION
AND SOCIETY 826 (2009).
71. IAS 32.11, IAS 39.9.
72. Of. Laux & Leuz, supra note 70, at 826.
73. Mattli & Biuthe, supra note 63, at 261-62.
74. On the thinning boundary between legal and social norms in transnational
governance see e.g. Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms:
The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2009).
75. On different techniques of integrating transnational norms into domestic legal
systems see Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1209
(2005).
76. See e.g. LAS 1 on Presentation of Financial Statements, especially IAS 1.7-8A, 1.27,
1.139-1.139L.
77. On the defining aspects of transnational legal processes see MORITZ RENNER,
ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT 215-28 (2011) (Ger.).
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given the force of law through public legislation.78 Second, they-at the
same time-bridge the gap between domestic and international
regulation. The international standards set by the IASB are expressly
incorporated into domestic law.79 Third, the IASB standard-setting
process combines normative universality with specificity of scope: the
standards are applicable worldwide, but narrowly restricted to a specific
issue area.80 All three features combined provide for a most efficacious
mode of transnational governance that avoids the shortcomings of the
domestic lawmaking process.
B. The Constitutionalization of International Financial Reporting
The generation of transnational legal norms in the field of financial
reporting is both enabled and limited by an emerging layer of
constitutional rules that assume a higher normative rank than the IAS
and IFRS standards and, at the same time, selectively open the
standard-setting process for inputs from political and scientific
discourse.
1. Normative Hierarchies
That the IASB standard-setting process is both enabled and limited
by higher ranking norms is most visibly expressed by the fact that the
IFRS Foundation, which oversees the IASB, established its own
"Constitution" in 2000. The IFRS Foundation Constitution (FC)81 lays
down the basic rules of governance of the IFRS Foundation 82 and
defines its numerous bodies: the Trustees, 83 the Monitoring Board,84 the
IASB,85 the Interpretations Committee,86 and the Advisory Council.87
Each body is vested with a specific set of competences; the interaction of
the bodies is regulated in a highly detailed manner. According to the
Constitution, the Monitoring Board of the IFRS Foundation,
78. See Mattli & Biuthe, supra note 63, at 255.
79. See Regulation (EC) No.1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 July 2002 on the Application of International Accounting Standards.
80. See Mattli & Buthe, supra note 63, at 235-37.
81. Constitution, IFRS FOUNDATION (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ifrs.org/The-
organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/IFRS-Foundation-
Constitution-January-2013.pdf
82. Id. at Sec. 3
83. Id. at Sec. 4-17.
84. Id. at Sec. 18-23.
85. Id. at Sec. 24-38.
86. Id. at Sec. 39-43.
87. Id. at Sec. 44-46.
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representing public capital market authorities, appoints the Trustees,
twenty-two individuals from all regions of the world representing "an
appropriate balance of professional backgrounds."8 8 These trustees in
turn appoint both the Advisory Council as well as the standard-setting
bodies in the strict sense, the IASB and the Interpretations Committee.
The IASB as the central standard-setting body comprises fourteen
members whose main qualifications "shall be professional competence
and practical expertise." 9
Figure 1: Structure of IFRS Foundation
Source: How We Are Structured, IFRS FOUNDATION, http://www.ifrs.org/the-
organisation/Pages/How-we-are- structured.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
The IFRS Foundation Constitution thus establishes secondary rules
in a manner highly similar to the organizational provisions of
nation-state constitutions:
88. Id. at Sec. 6-7.
89. Id. at Sec. 25.
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[T]hey may all be said to be on a different level from the
primary rules, for they are all about such rules; in the
sense that while primary rules are concerned with the
actions that individuals must or must not do, these
secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules
themselves. They specify the ways in which the primary
rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced,
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation
conclusively determined.90
In relation to the primary norms generated by the IASB (the IAS
and IFRS standards), the higher normative rank of the Constitution is
ensured by the strict requirements for constitutional revisions and
amendments. In a paradoxical move, also common in nation-state
constitutional documents, the IFRS Constitution defines these
requirements itself. In contrast to other decisions made by the Trustees,
for which a simple majority under the "one man, one vote" principle is
sufficient, amendments to the Constitution require a seventy-five
percent majority of the votes. At this point, it becomes apparent that the
IFRS Constitution is not merely an organizational constitution but the
constitution of a legal regime: It not only institutes and circumscribes
the powers of organizational actors but also structures a process of
rulemaking. With the possibility of constitutional amendments, this
rulemaking process becomes self-referential; the validity of the
rulemaking process is itself made dependent on a rulemaking process.9 1
Beyond the Constitution, another layer of secondary rules is
generated by the "Interpretations" issued by the Interpretations
Committee. The Interpretations Committee, consisting of "a group
representing, within that group, the best available combination of
technical expertise and diversity of international business and market
experience in the practical application of the IFRSs and analysis of
financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRSs."92 The
Committee, after a public consultation process, publishes
Interpretations regarding the application of IFRS standards. 93 The
Interpretations are authoritative and have the same normative status
as the standards themselves. 94 The Interpretations Committee
practically assumes the role of a Supreme Court in transnational
90. HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2nd ed. 1961).
91. Watrin, supra note 61, at paras. 3-7.
92. Constitution, supra note 81, at Sec. 39.
93. Id. at Sec. 43.
94. IAS 1.11 (c). See LAS 1-Presentation of Financial Statements, DELOITTE, available
at http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
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financial reporting. It institutes a (nonadversarial) procedure for
conclusively resolving conflicts of interpretation and generating
interpretive rules that effectively supersede the primary norms of the
standards.
2. Structural Couplings: Economy, Law, Politics, and Science
The emergence of normative hierarchies in transnational financial
reporting thus establishes the prerequisites for a lawmaking process
marked by the close interaction of economic and legal rationality. The
IFRS Foundation Constitution sets the framework for self-regulation of
economic actors through a transnational governance process. It fulfills
the central function of an economic constitution both institutionally
supporting and limiting market processes in the economic sphere by
allowing for an elaboration of financial reporting standards, which in
turn enable economic actors to make informed investment decisions. At
the same time, through the above-mentioned appointment procedures it
encompasses safeguards that ensure that the standard-setting process
is not distorted by economically powerful actors, corruption, or a simple
lack of information.
But how does this economic constitution account for the role of
politics? Does it fulfill the hopes of Societal Constitutionalism, opening
up perspectives for a reconciliation of Economic Constitutionalism and
Economic Democracy, a transnational politicization of the economy in
view of the systemic limitations of both economic and political
rationality?
To answer these questions, it is necessary, once again, to generalize
and respecify one of the central features of modern nation-state
constitutionalism, that is, the close trilateral interaction of the
functional systems of society not only with law, but also with politics
(the "magic triangle").95 Teubner's theory of Societal Constitutionalism
holds that, on the transnational level, the structural coupling96 between
law and other functional systems can be supplemented by an internal
politicization of the functional system concerned-in our case the
economy.9 7 As sketched above,98 a consistent application of the concepts
of systems theory should instead conceive of politics as a functionally
differentiated system on its own. The constitutionalization of
transnational governance processes in economic law can then be
95. TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 7.
96. On the concept of structural couplings see NIKLAs LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL
SYSTEM 381-422 (2004).
97. See TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 119-23.
98. See Section IV, supra.
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modeled as a structural coupling between three functional systems:
economy, law, and politics. 99 This trilateral model of economic
constitutions developed in the nation-state context is not only
sufficiently general to be applied to the transnational arena, it has the
additional advantage of acknowledging the fundamental
incommensurability of economic, political, and legal rationality.
Whether and how the global economy is not only coupled to legal but
also to political processes in the transnational arena can only be
analyzed with a view to specific institutions and procedures. In the case
of transnational standard setting in financial reporting, this demands a
closer look at the standard-setting process itself. The basic rules of this
process are, again, to be found in the IFRS Foundation Constitution.100
The Constitution foresees that the IASB as the central standard-setting
body shall "publish an exposure draft on all projects and normally
publish a discussion document for public comment on major projects in
accordance with procedures approved by the Trustees."101 It is only after
a public consultation process, which is further specified in the so-called
Due Process Handbook (DPH), that standards are finalized and
pipelined to the jurisdictional adoption process. 102
The DPH outlines six phases of the standard-setting process. In
phase one ("setting the agenda"), the IASB identifies potential fields of
regulation, potentially by conducting or supervising appropriate
research projects. 103 In phase two ("project planning"), a project team is
set up and potential areas of cooperations with other standard setters
are identified. In phase three ("discussion paper"), a paper is elaborated
and published that explains the issues addressed by the future
regulation and lists possible approaches to the issue, inviting
comments. 104 In phase four ("exposure draft"), a more detailed document
is elaborated "on the basis of staff research and recommendations."1 05
This "exposure draft" is the basis for the ensuing public consultations,
which are conducted mainly through the solicitation of comments for a
period of 120 days after publication of the draft. 0 6 In addition to
inviting comment letters, the IASB "often considers holding public
99. Of course, there is no single trilateral coupling mechanism, as Teubner understands
me to argue (TEUBNER, supra note 3, at 117), but two distinct structural economy-law and
law-politics. See RENNER, supra note 77, at 39-40.
100. Constitution, supra note 81.
101. Sec. 37 (b).
102. Constitution, supra note 81.
103. Due Process Handbook, Sec. 25-26, IFRS FOUNDATION (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/Documents/2013/Due-Process-Handbook-February-2013.pdf.
104. Id. at Sec. 31.
105. Id. at Sec. 39.
106. Id. at Sec. 41-44, 99-100.
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meetings with interested organizations to listen to and exchange views
on specific topics"; 107 it may also "arrange public round-table meetings
to discuss issues with interested parties."108 In stage five of the process
("development and publication"), the IASB then evaluates the results of
public consultation and, potentially after going through a second round
of consultations, finalizes and publishes the new standard. After the
standard is issued, it is implemented in domestic jurisdictions during
phase six ("procedures after an IFRS is issued"), and the IASB carries
out a post-implementation review.10 9
Figure 2: How IFRS Develops Standards
Source: Who We Are and What We Do, IFRS FOUNDATION, at 3, available at
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Documents/Who-We-Are-English-2013.pdf (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013).
Thus, the IASB standard-setting procedure at various stages allows
for a reflection of political rationality, or more precisely, exposes
structural couplings of the transnational legal process to an emerging
political system beyond the nation-state. The structural coupling of
economy and law, which is enabled by the IFRS Foundation
Constitution, is thus transformed into a trilateral constellation of
107. Id. at Sec. 105.
108. Id. at Sec. 107.
109. Id. at Sec. 53.
=
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economy, law, and politics. This is most visible in the public
consultation process as described by the Due Process Handbook. A
systemic view, which focuses on modes of communication rather than
solely on the participating actors, 10 shows that the consultations are
not dominated by the binary code of the economic system ("payment or
non-payment"),"' but increasingly subjected to the logics of the political
system ("power or powerlessness").112
In a typical consultation procedure, there are comment letters from
several hundred stakeholders."13 The stakeholders include large
corporations, both private and public (such as Royal Dutch Shell,
Unilever, and the Bank of China), business associations (such as the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India), nongovernmental
organizations in the broadest sense (such as the International Corporate
Governance Network), public authorities (such as the European Central
Bank, the World Bank, and the Autorit6 des marches financiers), and
academics. The stakeholders present themselves as representatives1 4 of
certain groups and interests. On this basis, they engage in a debate that
is in part highly technical, but at the same time makes reference to
more general aims. Although there seems to be hardly any guidance for
the IASB in evaluating and weighing stakeholders, the public
consultation process can thus be considered a reflection of an emerging
political discourse on the global stage, which not only comes very close
to Berle's model of public consensus but also fulfills the basic conditions
for a functional differentiation of political communication in the
Luhmannian sense.
For Luhmann, there is a functional differentiation of political
communication as soon as political discourse emancipates itself from its
social context by orienting discussions along the lines of political
allegiances (e.g., the 'left or right scheme") rather than toward the
solution of individual social conflicts.115 Accordingly, "political conflicts
are conflicts which only take place within the operationally closed
110. See generally LUHMANN, supra note 51.
111. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 69.
112. See generally LUHMANN, supra note 56.
113. See e.g. IFRS 9: Financial Instruments (Replacement of LAS 39), IFRS
FOUNDATION, available at http://www.ifrs.org/current-projects/iasb-projects/financial-
instruments-a-replacement-of-ias-39-financial-instruments-recognitio/Pages/financial-
instruments-replacement-of-ias-39.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
114. On the representative function of the 'stakeholder' concept in the transnational
constellation see Poul Kjaer, The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational
Constitutionalism: A Sociological Perspective, in AFTER GLOALIZATION-NEW PATTERNS OF
CONFLICT AND THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION 285-321 (Christian
Joerges & Tommi Rall eds., 2011).
115. LUHMANN, supra note 56, at 95.
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political system."116 And, paradoxically, this is made possible by the
very idea that actors in political discourse act as representatives of
certain interests or social groups, as it can be observed in the IASB
standard- setting procedure. The very idea of representation is based on
a problem of difference: 117 The representative and the represented are
never identical; rather, the object of representation ("the people" or
"stakeholders") is only created in the process of representation
("government" and "governance"). 118
As soon as this difference is established, references to the "common
good," as they are increasingly used in IASB consultations, must be
understood as referring to a "contingency formula."119 The concept of the
"common good" has no fixed meaning and no social substrate. Rather, it
allows for a political debate on the question of which issues can be
considered as political issues in the first place.120 It is at this point that
political discourse becomes self-referential and thus functionally
differentiated. Specifically, which private interests should be reflected
in public rulemaking can now be discussed politically. 121 If, for example,
the Anglo-American finance industry wants the principle of "fair value"
accounting to be implemented in IFRS standards, this particular
interest must be voiced in a manner that makes it acceptable as
promoting not merely vested interests, but a common good for all
parties concerned: more transparency, enhanced uniformity, and
simplicity of rules, for example. The IASB standard-setting procedure,
by way of its consultation procedure, not only reflects but also triggers
such processes of political debate. The transnational lawmaking process
between economy and law is thus closely coupled to an emergent
political discourse.
Less visibly than in public consultations, structural couplings
between law and politics can also be found at the very beginning and at
the very end of the standard-setting process. First, it is important to
keep in mind that the IFRS Foundation Trustees are appointed and
monitored by public capital market authorities. Second, it must be noted
that the adoption and implementation of IAS and IFRS standards is a
matter of domestic jurisdictions.1 22 At both points of the process,
nation-state politics, and thus parliamentary democracy, still play a
116. Id. at. 96.
117. See generally MICHEL FOUcAULT, LES MOTS ET LES CHOSES (1966) (Fr.).
118. See LUHMANN, supra note 56, at 116.
119. Id. at. 120.
120. Id. at. 122.
121. Id. at. 122.
122. For a critical account on this mechanism see Christian Kirchner & Matthias
Schmidt, Private Law-Making: IFRS-Problems of Hybrid Standard Setting, in
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND THE LAW 67-82 (Peter Nobel ed., 2005).
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role. Here, we can see that the trilateral constellation of economy, law,
and politics in the transnational arena is-as compared to the
nation-state model--complicated by an internal differentiation of the
global political system. 123 While economic communication is integrated
into a global system that has no difficulties in crossing the borders of
the nation-state and is increasingly supplemented by transnational
legal structures, the global political system is still fragmented into a
rudimentary form of genuinely global political discourse, on the one
hand, and politics within-and among-the nation-states on the other.
Both formations are reflected in the constitutionalization of
transnational economic governance.
But the constitutionalization of transnational governance in
financial reporting is not restricted to the trilateral constellation of
economy, law, and politics. It is striking how the IASB standard-setting
process, at various stages, also incorporates scientific knowledge and
research. Here, a development which can already be observed on the
nation-state level is continued and intensified. The coupling of economy,
law, and politics is increasingly stabilized by a further structural
coupling of law and science: lawmaking processes integrate and reflect
expert knowledge, thus mediating between normative and cognitive
expectation structures to adapt to complex regulatory environments. 1 24
VI. PERSPECTIVES
A close analysis of the IASB standard-setting process thus
demonstrates how transnational governance regimes materialize at the
boundary of economy and law, and how such transnational governance
regimes can be constitutionalized. Two features are defining for this
constitutionalization: the emergence of a hierarchy of primary and
secondary norms and the structural coupling of the transnational
law-making process to the political system. As the global political
system is marked by an internal multilevel structure, different levels
and different forms of political discourse are therein reflected.
But what does the analysis of this example for transnational
constitutionalization contribute to the ongoing debate between
Economic Democracy and Economic Constitutionalism? First, it should
teach proponents of both approaches modesty and realism-the same
modesty and realism that is shown by the early proponents of both
approaches, such as Naphtali and Bdhm. On the transnational level, the
123. LUHMANN, supra note 56, at 222.
124. Moritz Renner, Death By Complexity. The Financial Crisis and the Crisis of Law in
World Society, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE
OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 93-111 (Poul Kjaer, et al. eds., 2011).
963
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 20:2
conflict between economic and political rationality persists-even if in a
different form. 125 Novel models of public consultation and participation
do not allow for dissolution of the incommensurable rationalities into
deliberative universality. Neither do they institute a purified form of the
ordoliberal economic constitution. Rather, they combine elements of
both models. The example of transnational governance in financial
reporting clearly exhibits traits of an economic constitution in the
ordoliberal sense (containment of economic and political power by rules
of law). At the same time, it partially fulfills the normative hopes of
Economic Democracy by translating political decision-making structures
into the economic rules of the game (coupling of economic and political
discourse).
Thus, the paradoxical agenda of Societal Constitutionalism finds a
concrete institutional form in transnational economic governance,
allowing for a controlled interaction of economy and politics through
legal means. However, the transnational constellation of economy, law,
and politics in many ways mirrors the institutionalized legal and
political economy of the nation-states. As transnational economic
governance goes through ever more intense processes of juridification
and constitutionalization, comparable to those of the nation-states in
the nineteenth century, it is also bound to reenact the nation-state's
crises of power and legitimacy. 126 The open question is no longer
whether the global economy can be constitutionalized through a nexus of
law and politics, but which form of political discourse takes on in the
transnational constellation. Here, as the example of IASB
standard- setting demonstrates, references to public consensus oscillate
between appeals to deliberative democracy and invocations of expertise
or vested interests. But one can observe that the consultations within
the IASB procedures are by now becoming politicized in a very
fundamental sense: they increasingly refer to contingent conceptions of
the common good-and thus allow for genuinely political contestations
of the concept itself.
125. See KARL PoLANYI, GLOBALISATION AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL
MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke eds., 2011).
126. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATIONSPROBLEME IM SPATKAPITALISMIUS
(1973) (Ger.).
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